Using some new international data sets to produce both across-country econometric estimates as well as case studies of South American and southern European countries, we find that Social Security policies vary according to economic and demographic factors but that very different political histories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find weak partial correlation between democracy and the size of Social Security budgets, on how those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factors affect Social Security. If there is any observed difference between democracies and non-democracies, it is that the former spend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgets a bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than do economically and demographically similar non-democracies. Democracies and non-democracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducing retirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induce retirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.
I. Introduction
Does it matter whether public policies, or the leaders who determine them, are democratically elected? This is a fundamental question in political economics and public finance. As opportunities arise to introduce and reform political institutions (as in the European Union and Iraq), it is important to know how those institutions affect the organization and conduct of the public sector. Almost half of the world lives in a nondemocratic public sector, so comparisons between democracies and non-democracies tell us something about the degree to which public sector behavior in the two polities might have common explanations. Even the purely normative public finance economist sometimes wonders why public sectors do not always heed his advice, and is tempted to blame public sector mistakes on "the voters" (Caplan, 1997) . But if non-democracies make the same public policy mistakes as democracies, it seems unlikely that voters are to blame.
Economic theorists have not yet agreed as to the proper techniques for answering these questions. One approach emphasizes the role of voting mechanisms in determining policy and a second argues that democracy and other political mechanisms will be (at most) second-order determinants of policy choices once economic and demographic variables are taken into account.
1 Interestingly, a number of previous empirical studies have found that public budgets and major regulations are observed to be pretty similar in democratic and nondemocratic regimes (see, for example, Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin, 2004 , and the references cited therein). However, it is possible that public budgets are deceiving so that, for example, democracies and non-democracies might be spending the same amount on various public programs, but the methods of collecting and disbursing revenues depend very much on regime type. Our paper is the first in this literature to give significant attention to methods of collecting and disbursing revenues, which, in the case of Social Security, includes retirement tests, earnings tests, use of annuities versus lump sums, and the split of taxation between employers and employees. 2 3 International Labour Organization (various issues); data for the 1990's. For example, public pension spending/GDP exceeded 0.1 in Austria, France, and Italy. 4 For example, Meltzer and Richard's (1981) formal model confirmed de Tocqueville's (1835) fear that democracies would excessively redistribute from rich to poor. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) find a similar theoretical result. 5 An exception is Tabellini (1992) , who explicitly models the public pension system, concluding that the equal distribution of political power in democracies means that the poor are an important ally of the old in their quest to build a majority coalition.
A comprehensive study of public finance practices would include all public programs and their administrative details, but a study of the Social Security program by itself is a good place to start. Admittedly, a number of public policies, such as the criminalization of murder and other violent acts, are primarily determined by efficiency, in which case we expect little correlation between political institutions and the conduct of those policies. Political institutions should matter most for public policies that are affected at least as much by politics as by efficiency. Social Security is one of the most political of all public policies, as evidenced by the fact that political careers have been made and lost on the basis of an official's (or a political candidate's) perceived stance on Social Security questions. Another reason to start with Social Security is that public pensions and their reform are important topics in their own right because of their prominence in public budgets. Public pension expenditures are a large component of elderly assistance and, for example, have exceeded 10% of GDP in several countries. 3 If democracy had little effect on the largest of public programs, then its overall effect on public finance is likely (although not necessarily) small.
A study of democracy and Social Security also informs political economic theories because several of them predict that democracy creates more redistribution from rich to poor. 4 Many of the theories are relatively abstract in that they feature a single comprehensive government sector, without specifying particular public programs, or combination of programs that perform the redistribution.
5 Because many of the models have the government raise revenue with a flat tax on labor income, Social Security may be one of the first programs to examine empirically, because (as we show below) it almost always collects revenue with a payroll tax. Admittedly many models of rich-poor redistribution abstract from the life cycle and thus have no concept of "old age." On the other hand, redistribution models without a life cycle implicitly classify persons as rich or poor on the basis of lifetime income, as opposed to income for any particular year. In this regard, Social Security is interesting because it is one of the only public programs paying benefits as a function of lifetime income. 6 Note that several of the abstract models of rich-poor redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981 ) have a payroll tax as the revenue source, very much (as we show below) like actual Social Security programs. 7 Pension benefits are said to be "asset tested" or "earnings tested" if some or all benefits are withheld when the beneficiary's assets or earnings, respectively, exceed some threshold. Pension benefits are said to be "retirement tested" if some or all benefits are withheld when the beneficiary is employed (rather than retired).
literally as to the methods of revenue collection and disbursement, empirical results for Social Security are relevant to this literature because of the program's potential to redistribute income from rich to poor due to its large size, its reliance on direct taxes, and its distribution of revenue based on lifetime income. In other words, ignoring politics, it would take only a change in the magnitude of Social Security system parameters in order to redistribute significantly from rich to poor, or significantly from poor to rich. For example, Social Security payroll tax rates could rise with income (thereby favoring to poor) , or they could be capped (i.e., levied at a zero marginal rate on income above the cap, thereby favoring the rich).
6 Pension benefits could increase with lifetime income (thereby favoring the rich), or they could decline with lifetime income (thereby favoring the poor). Whether, and to what degree, system parameters are set in favor of the rich or the poor, depends on (efficiency and) politics. Thus it is interesting to know whether democracies or nondemocracies differ in their setting of those parameters. Our study measures whether Social Security revenues are obtained with capped payroll taxes, and whether benefits are disbursed with asset, earnings, or retirement tests. 7 Formal voting theory also suggests that the "form of the political game" is an important determinant of public policies, and not just a reaction to efficiency considerations. As explained by Myerson (1995) , an important goal of game theoretic models of public choice is to predict how different political institutions would result in different policies. Political institutions obviously differ between democracies and nondemocracies, so, on this account alone, we expect their Social Security programs to differ, although at the most abstract level we cannot say what is the nature or direction of those differences. More specific predictions are available, for example, if formal voting theory is right to emphasize majority voting rules. In this case, the relative size of the elderly population should be an especially important determinant of Social Security spending in democracies, because in democracies the elderly need to form a majority coalition. More generally, formal voting theory predicts that democracies' programs will have significant differences from those in non-democracies.
Formal models feature a voting process that mutes the expression of intense policy preferences and leads to inefficient policy outcomes. Of course, we expect Even if existing theories of redistribution were too abstract to be taken 8 And time has passed, so the data sets used in previous studies have expanded significantly, and improved in quality.
some parties, such as the unborn, to have their political voices muted even under democratic regimes. What is special about formal voting models is that many living persons also have their preferences ignored by public policy decisions. For example, Social Security is politically successful in Browning's (1975) , Cooley and Soares' (1999) , and Nataraj's (2001) democratic voting models because the old and the middle aged form a majority voting coalition which cannot be defeated by the (living) young regardless of the intensity of costs they bear. Even if we admit that some amount of Social Security is efficient (or at least desirable from the point of view of the currently living), democracies are likely, in theory, to spend beyond that amount because the costs to the young are inadequately weighted in public decisionmaking.
We find that, conditional on GDP, population age, and urbanization, democracy is not correlated with Social Security spending, or the methods by which Social Security revenues are obtained or spent. The growth of Social Security -in general or as associated with aging and economic development -is not a particularly democratic phenomenon. For example, Spain and Italy were economically and demographically similar during the years 1960-90. Italy was democratic throughout the period, during which time its public pension spending grew by 6.2 GDP percentage points. Spain was ruled by a dictator until 1975, during which time its public pension spending grew in parallel with Italy's. Spain adopted a democratic constitution in 1978, and its public pension spending continued to grow in parallel with Italy's. Quite simply, Spain's dictator was not better than Italy's democratic leadership at suppressing public pension spending growth. Nor did the adoption of a democratic constitution accelerate public pension spending.
In principle, the Social Security-democracy correlations might in fact be significant, but hard to observe because one or both sets of variables are poorly measured. An advantage we have in examining the empirical connection between democracy and Social Security is that the economics and political science literatures have accumulated a number of higher quality country-panel data sets.
8 These data sets include the Penn-World Tables, which allow for better cross-country comparisons of standards of living. Sala-i-Martin (1999, 2004a) have assembled a large country panel data set of measures and indicators of the design of Social Security systems. Over time, there have also been detailed country case studies of the design of Social Security programs (such as those collected by Gruber and Wise (1999) ), which allow for further quantitative comparison of various countries' Social Security systems. There are also multiple political science data sets measuring the extent and form of democracy in nearly all the countries of the world 9 Summary statistics for the variables are shown in the Appendix. 10 In its publication Cost of Social Security, the ILO reports spending by "Social Security and Assimilated Schemes" and "Family Allowances" in national currency units. It also reports pension spending as a fraction of spending by "Social Security and Assimilated Schemes" and "Family Allowances". To calculate public pension spending/GDP, we take the product of these two reports, and divide by the GDP reported by the ILO in national currency units. and, for any one of those countries, providing distinct democracy measures for each of dozens (if not hundreds) of years. Even without regard for the quality of our data, we can (and do) alleviate measurement concerns by exploiting the long time dimension of our data. One strategy involves averaging each country's economic and political variables over time, with the hope that some measurement errors wash out in the time averages. A second strategy is to select, according to measured timechanges in the democracy index, particular "case study" countries for time series analysis. These countries are then verified (from other sources) to have truly significant changes in their political institutions, and then examined for time-changes in the conduct of their Social Security programs.
Section II describes the political, economic and demographic data we use. Section III presents the main results of our regression analysis, showing how democratic and non-democratic regimes do not differ much when it comes to the size and the design of social security programs. Section IV presents five case studies. Section V concludes.
II. Our Data

II.A. Measures of Social Security Program Spending and Design
Our study includes three types of variables: 9 those that measure the size and design of SS programs around the world, those that estimate the degree to which a country is democratic, and economic and demographic variables. Our main sample consists of 90 countries with available measures of democracy, the fraction of the population aged 65+, (ppp adjusted) real GDP per capita, and "sufficient" information on public pension spending.
We measure annual public spending on old age pensions, as a share of GDP, and as reported by the International Labor Organization (hereafter, ILO). 10 The ILO reports that public pension spending is distinct from "family allowances," "unemployment benefits," "employment injury benefits," and "sickness-maternity 11 Our research has shown that, for OECD countries where more detailed country-comparable data is available since 1980, ILO reports are very similar to OECD calculations of spending on public old age, disability, and survivor pensions, exclusive of pension schemes for civil servants. We have the impression that the data for nonOECD countries is pretty accurate, although we have not conducted a systematic analysis of this point. 12 The two exceptions are for Italy and Spain, and derive from our case studies. ILO measures of pension spending/GDP for Italy fluctuates wildly from year to year and, in preparing the Italian case study, we obtained a public pension spending series from the Bank of Italy (we thank Alessandro Barbarino for helping us with this) that was very similar in definition to the ILO series, and with a very similar level and trend, but fluctuating much less from year to year. In preparing our Spanish case study, we found González-Catalá and Merino's (1985) study, which has a Spanish pension spending series that is very similar to ILO's, but includes the missing years 1967-74, so we use the González-Catalá and Merino (1985) series for those years. 13 Our Appendix shows which country-years are missing from the ILO pension spending data. Using the Social Security Administration's (1995) report of each country's Social Security program's first year, we have found that much of the missing ILO data derives from the fact that some countries did not have Social Security during each of the years 1960-90. We therefore fill in the ILO data with zeros for each year since 1960 and before the first year of Social Security (these years are also shown in the Appendix, are typically for African and Middle Eastern countries prior to 1975). Doing so has a minuscule effect on our regression results, because countries with young Social Security systems are spending practically zero in the years since their program began.
In general, the Appendix shows how we have nearly all years for European and North American countries, and for some Asian countries. The 1960's, and to some extent the 1970's, are missing for most of the other countries, including many for which we believe a Social Security program existed.
benefits."
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We have utilized ILO reports for the years 1960-90, with two exceptions. 12 The ILO database was continued until 1996, although already in 1991 it drops 20 of the 90 countries in our main sample. It is important for our purpose that the ILO reports are comparable for a pretty broad range of countries, because most of the non-democracies since 1960 are outside the OECD. We also believe that it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the effects on social security of the transition away from communism, which would dominate many of the democracynondemocracy comparisons after 1990. For these reasons, our dataset spans the years 1960-90. Henceforth, we refer to these ILO public pension spending data interchangeably as "public pension spending" and "Social Security spending."
There are 128 countries reporting some public pension spending in at least one of the years 1960-90, plus 22 additional countries for which we know that no Social Security program existed during at least some of those years. 13 Of the 128, most countries have missing data for some of those years; we work with each country's averages for the periods 1960-90, 1960-74, and 1975-90 , where the averages are calculated using whatever years are available for the country. 104 of 14 The countries without Social Security spending data tend to be younger. They may also be poorer and less democratic, although the coefficient estimates for these variables (in a probit for sample inclusion) are statistically insignificant. If we set spending for the 14 excluded countries at zero, OLS and median regression estimates of Social Security spending equations show a democracy coefficient that is slightly smaller in magnitude (less negative, and statistically insignifant) than those shown below. the 128 countries report positive public pension spending in at least 5 of the years 1960-90 and on this criterion are eligible for inclusion in our main 90 country sample.
14 Based on reports of the U.S. Social Security Administration, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) have compiled a three year (1958, 1975, and 1995) crosscountry panel data set of such indicators of Social Security design. These indicators include whether there is a Social Security payroll tax, how the payroll tax is shared between employer and employee, whether the payroll tax is capped, whether the elderly must exit employment to collect public pension benefits, whether benefits are earnings tested, or means tested, and whether benefits are credited for delayed retirement. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004a) add to this data set indicators of whether 1995 benefits were paid as lump sums or life annuities. Hence, we can address the question of whether democratic and nondemocratic governments administer their programs in similar ways, even when they spend similar amounts on them.
Although our spending and design numbers are of good quality, there are some missing observations and, even with all of the observations, it is difficult to reduce the variety of elderly subsidies to one or two numbers. For this reason, case studies are an important part of our analysis, since those studies do not require numbers that are comparable across a large number of countries -just the few countries in the case study. Our case study analysis utilizes data from a variety of country-specific sources, so we do not have to reduce "Social Security" or "democracy" to a single number.
There are a few measurement issues which are particular to spending data, and may be correlated with democracy. First, democracies may have spending, GDP, and demographic data of higher quality. Better measurement of the latter two variables suggests that we may observe greater sensitivity of spending to GDP and demography in the democratic countries, even when the actual sensitivity is the same under both types of regimes. Second, our spending variable does not include military pensions, and military pensions may be more prevalent (relative to public pensions for civilians) in nondemocratic countries, so we may understate the amount of public pension spending in nondemocratic countries. Third, nondemocratic governments may be more prone to create economic data that favors the government's image. It is hard to say how this third issue would affect our estimates, since non-democracies 15 Gastil and his colleagues classify countries in a range from 1 to 7, 1 being the countries where political rights are more developed and protected and 7 those where political rights are poorest. might exaggerate both GDP and the amount of assistance for the elderly and thereby not distort the ratio of the two.
II.B. Indicators of Democracy
Both the theoretical and empirical literatures comparing democracies and nondemocracies consider democracy as a matter of degree. Although our prose sometimes describes democracies and non-democracies as if they were two distinct categories with no variation within them, we follow this tradition by using democracy measures that can take on several values between zero and one. The regression coefficients reported below can be interpreted as the dependent-variable difference between a country at one democracy extreme (such as the United States and some others) with a democracy index of one and those countries at the other extreme (such as Spain under Franco).
We use three different sources of data for our democracy variables. The first and main source is the POLITY IV project which calculates for 181 countries going back as far as 1800, among other things, a democracy index taking integer values 0-10, an autocracy index taking integer values 0-10 (we divide both of these by 10 to put on a 0-1 scale), and a 0,1,2,3 indicator of the extent to which government executives are chosen through competitive elections (which we divide by 3). The democracy index includes as one component the elections indicator, plus rules for political participation, and the transfer of executive power. The autocracy index has the same components as the democracy index, but weights them differently (and negatively). The POLITY data are available for only 94 of the 104 countries for which we have sufficient Social Security spending data. The POLITY data are missing during years of occupation, political interruption, or political transition (e.g., occupation by foreign powers, a collapse of central political authority, or an executive guided process of institutional planning).
In his international studies of economic growth (e.g., Barro 1994 Barro , 1998 for 1972, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 . For those years, it is highly correlated with the POLITY democracy index. Relatively speaking, the POLITY democracy index does little to distinguish among the least democratic countries; nearly all country-years scored 0-0.33 by (Barro's transformation of) Gastil are scored 0 by POLITY. Another difference between POLITY and GASTIL is that a few Latin countries are scored pretty high by Gastil and very low by POLITY.
The third source is Bollen (1980) and Bollen and Grandjean (1981) , widely known as the Bollen democracy measure, which was used by a previous study of Social Security and democracy, Pampel and Williamson (1989) . This measure is only available for the years 1960 and 1965 and for different samples of countries. Also, Bollen specifies his criteria to be a mix of the extent of determinate political factors such as press freedom, freedom of group opposition, government sanctions, fairness of election, executive selection and legislative selection. The Bollen measure seems to give a bigger weight to civil rights than does POLITY's.
Although the various democracy indices may be of good quality, it is difficult to reduce democracy to a single number. Hence one reason to extend the empirical analysis to case studies, as in our section V, is that case studies do not require numbers that are comparable across a large number of countries and can thereby rely more on descriptions of political situations from country-specific sources.
II.C. Economic and Demographic Variables
Public pensions are paid to old people, so it may be important to know the number of old people in the population. For this purpose we use the share of population who is 65 years old or older. This variable comes from the ILO (1996) and is available only at ten year intervals. We construct each country's averages for the periods 1960-90, 1960-75 and 1976-90. There has been significant progress in recent years in the measurement of some key economic variables. The Penn World Tables now report a broad crosscountry panel of comparable indicators of standards of living, including real GDP per capita, which we utilize for the years 1960-89. Four of the 94 countries who have sufficient pension spending data and are included in POLITY do not have either real GDP or demographic data, so our main sample has 90 countries. We also use World Bank variables measuring the fraction of population in urban areas, and fraction of the labor force in agriculture, averaged for the years 1960-75, in part because these variables proxy for the level of development, but also because they indicate the fraction of the population that may have been covered by the public pension system during their working lives (note that many countries, including the U.S., do not or have not covered agricultural workers).
The shape of the income distribution is important for some of the votingbased theories of social security. We therefore utilize some of the recent improvements in the construction of cross-country comparable indicators of income inequality, and income distribution skewness. In particular we use data elaborated by Deininger and Squire (1996) to obtain multiple income distribution measures of 16 See Deininger and Squire for some explanation of how their income distribution measures are most often derived from comprehensive coverage of the population, and comparable concepts of income and expenditure. See Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) for a critical view of the Deininger and Squire data set. 17 We have 17 totally nondemocratic (namely index=0 for all years) countries in our data (Bahrain, C. African Rep., Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Oman, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia) and 22 totally democratic (namely index=1 for all years) countries (including the U.S., Japan, Papua New Guinea, and several European countries). good quality for a broad cross-section of countries. 16 Specifically, we use their Gini coefficient and the share of income held by the 40% richest share of the population (created by subtracting the third quintile from their data from 1). We also follow Barro (1998) and use the Gini coefficient for educational attainment as another indicator of inequality.
III. Regression Analysis
We now analyze empirically the relationship between the democracy index, pension spending, and pension program design in a couple of broad cross-sections of countries.
III.A. Results from our 1960-90 Cross Section
III.A.1. Evidence on the Amount of Social Security Spending
The correlation between democracy and social spending is displayed in the first column of our Table 1 , where we regress time-averaged public pension spending over GDP on the time-averaged POLITY democracy index in our main sample of 90 countries. Since our democracy index is on a 0-1 scale and Social Security expenditure is measured as a percentage of GDP, the coefficient of 3.73 indicates quite a large difference between a totally democratic country and a totally nondemocratic country 17 -3.73 percentage points of GDP. This result is not new. Jackman (1975) is an early empirical study of social spending policies and political performance for a sixty-country sample in 1960. In several chapters of his book, he examines the effect of democracy and political stability on three different rough measures of social equality: SIPE (Social Insurance Program Experience, which for each country can be interpreted as the number of 18 Jackman and Cutright (1965) are interested in welfare and unemployment programs as well as pensions, and some countries began some program at a different date than the other programs. Therefore, they calculate each country's SIPE as the cross-program average of years since program creation. Our analysis of the SIPE (see "year of first law" below) is only for the old age pension program.
19 Although Flora and Alber (1982) suggest that nondemocratic regimes may introduce social programs earlier. 20 For example, economic prosperity may permit a country to become democratic, as suggested by Barro (1998) and many others. 21 Jackman uses an economic development indicator rather than log gdp per capita and elderly's population share. years since their SS program was created), 18 the Schultz coefficient and a Social Welfare Index. Since we are looking at the correlation between democracy and the size and design of Social Security programs, Jackman's SIPE estimates are the relevant ones for this study. Measuring democracy following the criteria set forth by Dahl (1956) , Downs (1957) and Lenski (1966) , Jackman finds a strong positive correlation between SIPE and the democracy index.
19 However, we explain in some detail below why we, he and others do not interpret this correlation as a democracy effect.
Pampel and Williamson (1989) study a 32 country panel for the years 1950-80, using social spending measures and the Bollen democracy index. They show how democratic governments have larger social budgets, a cross-country correlation which is not surprising given that Jackman found democratic governments to have more SIPE.
However, both Jackman (1975) and Pampel and Williamson (1989) point out that, even if democracy had no direct impact on Social Security policies, significant differences between democratic and nondemocratic countries are to be expected given that democratic countries are often economically and demographically unusual. 20 Hence, the simple correlation might not indicate an effect of democracy, but instead proxy for economic and demographic variables that, for example, would affect citizens' policy preferences regardless of the political regime. These authors therefore include log gdp per capita and the fraction of the population over age 65 21 in the regression, and show how the partial correlation with democracy is zero or finding in our data, as seen in our second and third columns of Table 1 , which deviate from the first column by including the gdp, elderly, urban population, and trade openness variables in the regression and report smaller (or even negative) democracy coefficients.
22 Cutright (1965) also tries to separate the effects of economic development from those of the "political representativeness" of a nation's institutions. He indicates that there is a weak partial relation between SIPE and political representativeness, although it is hard to say whether his results conform with the other studies, since Cutright uses a cross-tabular analysis (rather than multiple regression) and his political representativeness index is not necessarily an index of democracy. 23 Although we infer from a paragraph in Easterly and Rebelo (1993, p. 436) , that they looked at a cross-country regression of Social Security spending on GDP, democracy, and other variables, finding no democracy effect. 24 Parts of the Lindert (1994) paper (e.g., the abstract) suggest that democracy leads to more Social spending, and therefore appear to contradict the conclusions of other studies. However, his recent work (2002) explains in more detail how his 1994 findings actually show that more voter turnout is associated with more public pension spending among democracies, and that there is not an important spending difference between democracies and nondemocracies. This can be seen in his 1994 Table 2 where, holding constant the economic and demographic variables, the pensions column shows that the average nondemocracy spends 0.33 percentage points of GDP more than the average democracy. We calculate this by adding his democracy intercept term (-1.18) to his female suffrage coefficient (0.02) times the mean democratic female suffrage (0.372) plus his turnout coefficient (1.57) times the mean democratic turnout rate (0.534) to get -0.33. 25 Notice that our democracy variable also takes some account of different "intensities" of democratic regimes, although not according to population voting rates.
negative, rather than positive as with the raw correlation. 22 We have a very similar relation between social security spending and democracy with a formal statistical analysis. 23 He has a twenty-one-country panel composed of many of the (now) OECD countries plus Argentina and Brazil for the period 1880-1930 -a sample evenly split between democracies and nondemocracies -and finds the typical democracy to spend the same fraction of GDP on SS as the typical nondemocracy once GDP per capita, the elderly fraction of the population, and other variables are held constant. 24 Lindert does not explore implications unique to voting-based political-economic theories of social security, except by including the voter turnout rate and a female suffrage dummy in a social spending regression for his democratic observations. 25 Not long after Lindert, Sala-i-Martin (1996) created a cross-country data set of Social Security programs for the year 1989, and pointed out (p. 288) that Social Security programs have emerged during nondemocratic regimes such as the USSR under Lenin, Spain under King Alfonso XIII, and Japan under Emperor Hirohito and during democratic regimes such as the 20 th century UK, US, and Sweden.
As explained above, our data suggest that democracies spend more of their GDP on Social Security merely because they are richer and older. Columns (4)- (6) of Table 1 further explore this point, by introducing continent dummies into the regression. By comparing columns (1) and (5), we see how much of the raw Peter Lindert (1994) is, to our knowledge, the first economist to explore the 26 The F-stat for the hypothesis of all continent coefficients equal zero is 1.19; the p-value of the test (6 coefficients and 78 degrees of freedom) is 32%. 27 The point estimate is -3 in our 63 country sample. Cutler and Johnson (2001) apply the econometric duration model to explaining year of first law in a sample of 17 high income countries, and find "nondemocracies" (defined as Flora et al 1983 do: a country with a "powerful non-elected ruler") to adopt Social Security programs slightly earlier than other countries.
Other cross-country studies not concerned with the democracy effect (e.g., Aaron 1967) have included year of first law as an independent variable in Social Security regressions, finding old programs to spend more. A raw correlation like this is obvious in our data (almost one percentage point of GDP for each 10 years of program age), although the partial correlation (holding GDP and elderly share constant) is economically insignificant (one percentage point for each 50 years of program age, s.e. = 0.5 percentage points).
democracy-spending correlation is across continents, rather than within. In fact, column (4) shows how most of the correlation is explained by the difference between Europe (democratic and high spending) and the rest of the world -Europe explains 4.08 percentage points of the spending share while democracy explains only 1.59. Column (6) suggests that continent dummies may themselves proxy for GDP per capita and the elderly share, since a comparison of columns (3) and (6) shows that introducing the continent dummies does little to the regression coefficients or fit when the regression already includes GDP per capita and elderly's share. 26 The insignificance of the continent dummies suggest that there is little spatial correlation in the residuals in our spending model, and hence no strong evidence that countries tend to follow policies of their neighbors.
One rough indicator of whether nondemocratic governments are following the policies used in otherwise similar democratic countries is the number of years of experience with Social Security. Like Jackman (1975) , we find a negative correlation between democracy (1960-90) and the year in which the first Social Security law was passed, but a near zero partial correlation once we control for age and income. In particular, we find in our 90 country sample that the first Social Security law is, on average, 35 years earlier for democratic countries (not reported in the Table; two countries must be dropped because SSA does not report). Regressing year of first law on the democracy index, log GDP per capita, the elderly population share, the urban population share, and trade openness, we estimate a democracy coefficient of -7 (s.e.=5). 27 Hence, nondemocratic countries do not have systematically less Social Security experience than do similar democracies. Since there have been a number of transitions in the 20 th century between democracy and nondemocracy, and we (and Jackman) are using the democracy index later in the There are some difficulties in interpreting the "year of first law" data for this purpose, and combining them with historical democracy indices. For example, we suspect that newly independent democracies are likely to "reinvent" Social Security after gaining independence from a colonizer or dictator, and hence report to SSA a year of first law that is after the year in which country residents first enjoyed public pension program participation. A better data set would be like that used by Cutler and Johnson in their duration study. 29 6.0 is our 90 country sample average of the percentage of the population over age 65. 30 In theory, the average taxable income in the economy determines the amount of revenue that can be raised from income taxes, and the median income determines the amount of taxes that the median voter would lose by siding with the old in favor of an income redistribution scheme. The ratio of mean to median income is therefore not only an measure of income distribution skewness, but also an indicator of the net gain from redistribution to the coalition of old and poor (Tabellini, 1992) . See also Meltzer and Richard (1981) or Alesina and Rodrik (1994) for additional models of the links between redistribution and income distribution skewness. (7)- (10). Column (7) interacts the elderly population share (minus 6 percentage points) with democracy (minus one). We have subtracted constants from each of the variables in the interaction term, so that the coefficient on the population share by itself can be interpreted as the democratic population share effect, and the coefficient on democracy by itself can be interpreted as the democracy-nondemocracy gap among otherwise similar countries with six percent of their population over age 65. 29 The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and practically zero, and we see in comparison with column (3) that the coefficients on age and democracy by themselves are unchanged when we include the interaction term.
Formal voting models not only suggest that democracies should spend more on Social Security, but that the largest democratic programs should be those in countries with the most skewed income distribution. 30 Columns (8)- (10) Peltzman (1980) finds inequality to be associated with smaller government across countries. Tabellini (1992) is the only study we know that finds a positive relation between government spending (which he measures as Social Security and Welfare spending as a ratio to the elderly population, GDP, or total government spending, averaged for the years 1978-82) and inequality (measured as the pre-tax income going to the top 20%, as a ratio of that going to the bottom 20%). His sample has about 60 countries including some nondemocracies, and his inequality variable has a statistically significant inequality coefficient in 5 out of 12 specifications (see his Tables 3 and  4) . His analysis does not include GDP per capita, except as it determines his dummy variable for "industrialized countries." 32 Since we use the constants 35 and 1 in the interaction term, the coefficient on democracy by itself can be interpreted as the the democracy-nondemocracy gap among otherwise similar countries with Gini-35 (fairly typical, although slightly above average, for Europe) and the coefficient on Gini by itself can be interpreted as the effect of Gini in a democracy. 33 In their study of 17 countries' time until adopting Social Security, Cutler and Johnson (2001) find countries with more ethnolinguistic fractionalization to adopt Social Security somewhat later. They do not interact democracy with fractionalization. relation between Social Security spending and income inequality, using the Gini coefficient. We have the Gini coefficient for only 65 of the 90 countries, so we use column (8) to demonstrate that the results are not too different in the smaller sample (compare with column (3)). Column (9) introduces the Gini coefficient as a predictor of Social Security spending's GDP share, but its estimated coefficient is negative and practically zero. Perhaps this result is not surprising since several researchers (e.g., Benabou 1996 , Lindert 1996 , and Perotti 1996 have failed to find inequality to be associated with bigger government across countries.
31 Column (10) interacts (Gini-35) with (democracy-1), and the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is practically zero. 32 We find similar results if we replace the income Gini coefficient with the education Gini coefficient as calculated from the Barro and Lee (1996) data on educational attainment.
Another indicator of the heterogeneity of a country's residents is Easterly and Levine's (1997) index of "ethnolinguistic fractionalization". The index is on a 0-1 scale, and measures the probability that two randomly selected residents speak a different language. Although not shown in our tables, we have included this variable in our spending regressions, and its estimated coefficient is always economically and statistically insignificant. 33 We do not find any evidence of an interaction between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and democracy.
Voting theories may not tell us whether GDP should affect spending more or less in a democracy, but a simple theory of measurement error might. For example, we might expect better quality GDP data in democracies, so that we would observe pension spending to be more sensitive to measured GDP among democracies. If we add the interaction term to column (3), that term's estimated coefficient (not shown 34 Although not shown in the Table, we have also found that the relationship between spending and fraction of labor force in agriculture, or between spending and GDP, is the same in democracies and nondemocracies. The only interaction term we have found to be even marginally significant is between democracy and fraction urban, with the nondemocracies' spending slightly more sensitive (the hypothesis that this interaction term's coefficient is zero has p-value 0.06) to urbanization.
Allowing for other explanatory variable nonlinearities -such as age and income polynomials, or replacing the continuous democracy variable with a dummy variable indicating high democracy -does not affect the results. Nor do the results change with nonlinear transformations, such as log or square root, of the spending variable.
35 e.g., the theory of Becker and Barro (1988, pp. 17-18) although Social Security's effect on fertility is temporary in their model. Ehrlich and Lui (1998) and Ehrlich and Kim (2001) have models with permanent fertility effects of Social Security. 36 e.g., the theory of Philipson and Becker (1998) . 37 A reverse causal mechanism which may be contemporaneous is that high social security tax rates encourage young people to emmigrate, which raises elderly's population share.
in Table 1 ) is statistically insignificant and its magnitude is -0.33, which implies GDP coefficients of -0.58 and -0.24 for democracies and non-democracies, respectively.
34
Population age is one of the main predictors of public pension spending. In theory, age can affect pension spending, and pension spending can affect age. Older populations may spend more on old age pensions because, by definition, only the elderly are eligible for old age transfers. The size of the elderly population may also determine political support for social security. Pensions can in theory affect the age of the population by discouraging fertility 35 or mortality, 36 although these "reverse causal" effects are not contemporaneous, since in these theories current demographics are affected by the anticipation of future pensions. Perhaps our finding (to be shown in detail later) that decade-to-decade growth in pension spending is closely related to the growth of the elderly population over those same decades suggests that these reverse causal effects are a minor part of the agespending correlation shown in Table 1 . 37 We have "life expectancy" data for all but five of the countries in our 90 country sample (Bahrain and Iceland are missing life expectancy information), and life expectancy is correlated 0.78 with the elderly population share. If we add life expectancy to the pension spending regression (specification not shown in Table 1 ), its coefficient is small (0.041, s.e.=0.027), which may suggest that the elderly population share effect may be the same regardless of whether the age distribution can be explained by fertility, mortality, or migration. 38 The spending regressions shown in Table 1 look similar if we confine our attention to the 65 country sample used in Table 2 .
Standard errors on the democracy coefficient are a bit smaller when POLITY IV's democracy score is used, as in Table 1 , rather than any of the other democracy indices. Our point estimates are not sensitive to the use of alternative indices. To see this, consider variations on Table 1 's specification (6) (the variations are not shown in the Table) . If we replace the POLITY IV democracy score with (one minus) its autocracy score, the coefficient on the score is -0.68 (s.e.=0.51) rather -0.80, the GDP coefficient is -0.30 rather than -0.20, and the other coefficients are quite similar. Using POLITY IV's election index yields a democracy coefficient of -0.73 (s.e.=0.55). Using Gastil's or Bollen's index gives (in slightly smaller samples with the available data) coefficients of -1.07 (s.e.=0.63) and -0.22 (s.e.=0.61), respectively. Column (1) is a regression of the fraction of time (for the years 1958, 1975, and 1995 only) a country had "induced retirement" (i.e., had a retirement or an earnings test as part of its Social Security benefit formula) on similar variables used as in column (3) of Table 1 (fraction of the labor force in agriculture replaces log GDP). We see no statistically significant partial relation between democracy or the elderly population share and induced retirement, while more agricultural countries are more likely to induce retirement. Columns (2) and (3) show that these results are robust to introducing continent dummies, and that South American countries have less induced retirement than others. Column (4) excludes the agriculture and elderly shares from the regression; the coefficient on democracy is still insignificant. The rest of the columns of Table 2 separate the retirement test from the earnings test. Columns (5) and (6) use the retirement test as the dependent variable. The coefficient on democracy in column (5) is negative and significant which suggests that democracies are less likely to induce retirement with a retirement test. Column (6) includes agricultural and elderly shares and the coefficient on democracy becomes insignificant, which suggests, again, that democracy is correlated with design variables only because it proxies for economic development as developed countries tend to be more democratic.
III.A.2. Evidence on Benefit Formulas
Columns (7) and (8) have the earnings test as the dependent variable. The coefficient on democracy is positive which suggests that democracies are more likely to induce retirement with an earnings test. However, it is again the effect of income and age, and not democracy, that affects the method by which retirement is induced, because the democracy coefficients are practically zero once we control for GDP and the elderly population share (see column (8)). Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2004a, pp. 19-20) explain how, when it comes to the payment of benefits as a lump sum or a life annuity, countries fall into three categories. Provident Funds are typical of the first category, in which all beneficiaries are paid in, or have the option of payment as, a lump sum upon reaching retirement age. The second category of countries pay life annuities only to retirees who contributed to the Social Security system for many years, while other contributors are paid lump sums called "old age settlements." Finally, the third category of countries, which includes the U.S., pays life annuities to all beneficiaries. Our data on log average GDP 1960-89, British legal origin, log population, and democracy 1975-90, can be used to predict the type of country that might be in a particular category in 1995, and to estimate a partial correlation between democracy and the propensity to pay Social Security benefits as lump sums. In a probit of having a 1995 system offering all beneficiaries lump sums on these variables, the marginal effect of British legal origin is 0.12 (not surprising, since Provident Funds are a British tradition), while the marginal effect of democracy is only 0.01 (tstat=0.4). In a probit for having old age settlements in 1995, two marginal effects are statistically significant: the -0.14 on log average GDP and the -0.08 on log population. Democracy's marginal effect is 0.04 (t-stat=0.3). In summary, the decision to pay Social Security benefits as a life annuity rather than a lump sum seems unrelated to democracy, rather deriving from economic development, British tradition, and scale economies. 39 We do not model the use of a payroll tax, since Australia and New Zealand are the only countries without a payroll tax sometime during our sample. section of countries. 39 The two dependent variables used in the Table are whether the country's Social Security payroll tax was capped (a 0-1 variable for each year) and the employee tax rate as a fraction of the sum of the employee and employer tax rates (each dependent variable is averaged over the three years 1958, 1975, 1995 for each country). The sample is the same as in Table 2 , except that Australia is omitted because it does not have payroll taxes during any of the years we study. Columns (1)- (6) model the capping of the payroll tax. Columns (1)- (3) have a democracy index as the only independent variable, and show how democracies are more likely to have their payroll tax capped although the coefficient is least significant when the POLITY IV democracy index is used. To put it another way, our 64 country sample is evenly divided according to whether the time-average POLITY democracy index is greater or less than 0.4, but only 4 of the 15 countries not capping their payroll tax have index greater than 0.4.
Columns (4)- (6) add GDP per capita, the elderly population share, continent dummies, and a British colony dummy to the regressions, and we see a larger coefficient on the democracy index. Because a country's highest earners enjoy the direct benefit of capped payroll taxes, and we see more democracies with caps, our findings seem at odds with Tabellini's model, where the voting process creates Social Security from a coalition of the old and the poor.
Does the capping of the Social Security payroll tax explain why we see democracies spend less than otherwise similar non-democracies? Consider two cross-country public pension spending regressions using the sample of 64 countries from Table 3 that suggest this is not a big part of the story. The first has the same independent variables as Table 1's column (3) -democracy, GDP, and the elderly population share -and produces a similar democracy coefficient estimate of -0.84 (s.e.=0.52). The second regression adds the capped payroll tax as an independent variable. The GDP and elderly share coefficient estimates are quite similar in the two regressions, while the democracy coefficient estimate only falls in magnitude from 0.84 to 0.72 (s.e.=0.52), and the payroll tax cap coefficient is -0.61 (s.e.=0.37). Hence, use of the payroll tax cap may explain part, but not all, of democracies' spending less on Social Security.
Columns (7)- (10) look at the (nominal) split of the payroll tax between employers and employees. The U.S. has always split its payroll tax equally between III.A.3. Evidence on Payroll Taxation   Table 3 presents empirical evidence on the design of the payroll tax in a cross- 40 This result is probably not very robust, because in previous work (Mulligan and Sala-iMartin 1999) using somewhat different samples and spending measures, we found a significantly negative coefficient on the split variable.
purposes, so we might expect democracies to be different in this regard. The positive democracy coefficients in columns (7)- (10) suggest that democracies put a little bit more of the tax on the employee.
The dependent variables in Tables 2 and 3 are time averages of dummy variables, and hence lie in the interval [0, 1] . It is conceivable that non-linear models, such as the two-sided Tobit, or an ordered probit, might reveal different relations between retirement and/or earnings tests and the independent variables. Although not shown in the Table 2 , we have introduced the independent variables in two-sided Tobit and ordered probit models, and the same results are found: democracy predicts the use of the earnings test as a substitute for the retirement test only in models without income and age, South American countries are less likely to use retirement tests, and former British colonies are less likely to use an earnings or retirement test. Table 3 also shares its results with those that are obtained from nonlinear specifications (not shown in the table): democracies are marginally more likely to cap their payroll tax or to put more of the tax on the employee, although some of the specifications (depending on the method for measuring democracy and the other independent variables included) suggest no democracy effect. We can investigate the effect of the visibility of Social Security taxes on the size of the budget by considering three cross-country public pension spending regressions using the sample of 64 countries from Table 3 . The first has the same independent variables as Table 1's column (3) -democracy, GDP, the elderly population share, the urban population share, and openness. The second adds the split variable to the set of regressors. The split coefficient of 1.97 (s.e.=1.34) is economically significant, and the democracy coefficient is more negative than in the first regression. 40 The third regression adds to the second a regressor interacting split and democracy, and its coefficient is found to be economically and statistically insignificant (coef=0.81, s.e.=2.90). These three regressions suggest that tax visibility may be correlated with the size of the program, but that its empirical relation is not different in democracies vs. nondemocracies. employer and employee, so our employee share variable is 0.5 for the U.S. 0.5 is common internationally, but there still is a lot of international variation in the employee share. Without minimum wages, the usual economic analysis predicts that it does not matter who nominally pays the tax, but the split may matter for political (e) Recent British colonies variable = 1 for all countries under British rule for more than 50 years since 1850. 41 As discussed above, there are not many countries in our sample with significant changes in the democracy index. Even if we did have more frequent democracy changes, a higher frequency analysis of our data would be inappropriate for our purposes, because, among other things, some of the cross-country measures are likely interpolated at high frequencies, and the theories tested do not purport to be theories of the short run effects of political institutions. 42 Excluding those fourteen countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Mali, Peru, and Rwanda eliminated because lack of spending data, and Bahrain, Kuwait, and Bulgaria eliminated because of lack of real GDP data) from Table 1 's sample has almost no effect on point estimates, except to increase the democracy coefficient by 0.1 (e.g., the democracy coefficient becomes 3.8 in column (1), and -0.79 in column (6)).
43 Column (6)'s results would be similar if the continent dummies were excluded.
III.B. Country Panel Evidence on Social Security Spending
In order to examine the growth of the SS program, we partition our sample in two time periods : 1960-74 and 1975-90 . We choose this division because it is an equal split chronologically, and point out how it corresponds with the chronological discussion of our European Case Studies (see below). 41 Fourteen of the 90 countries in Table 1 's sample do not report social security spending or real GDP for more than one or two of the years 1960-74, so we exclude them from the spending growth analysis.
42 Table 4 's column (1) shows how Social Security spending grew more (by 1.6 GDP percentage points) in democracies than non-democracies (as classified in 1960-74) . But this may derive from the relation between GDP per capita and spending growth, because the partial correlation between democracy (holding constant initial log GDP per capita, and its change over time) and Social Security spending is zero or negative, as shown in column (2).
Older countries and aging countries had more Social Security spending growth, as shown in column (3). European countries also had more spending growth, and the inclusion of continent dummies in the spending model makes the democracy coefficient more negative. Columns (5) and (6) add the 1960-74 to 1975-90 change in the democracy index to the models shown in columns (1) and (4). We see in Column (5) that, without additional controls, democratic countries, especially those that were democratic at the end of the period, appear to have the most spending growth. However, column (6) shows how this derives from the different demographics 43 of democratic countries: countries that begin democratic may have a bit less spending growth. Country fixed effects can be added to a spending level model (such as those shown in Table 1 ) by regressing the change in Social Security spending on the changes in the economic and demographic variables. Table 4 's columns (7) and (8) report such estimates. Column (7) shows how spending grows more in countries that become more democratic, but not when the changes in age and log real GDP are held constant (as in column (8)). Column (9) adds continent dummies to the model (that is, allowing each continent have its own spending change), and still finds an economically and statistically insignificant coefficient on democracy.
The main lesson from this section is that, once we hold constant per capita income and elderly population share, there appear to be no differences in the size, growth or design of SS programs between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Although not shown in Table 4 , various democracy-interaction terms can be added to the models there, and the point estimates on the interaction terms are economically and statistically insignificant. Hence, democracies and nondemocracies also seem to be similar in terms of the reaction of their pension spending growth to the economic and demographic variables.
IV. Case Studies
It is helpful to see whether the regression results for the 90-country sample are confirmed with case studies, especially since the regression estimates with country fixed effects hinge on the handful of countries that actually had a significant democracy change during our sample period. An advantage of the case studies is that they can rely more on country-specific data sources that may not be available for a broad cross-section. Another advantage is that the case studies may help us gauge the importance of various causal mechanisms. For example, it may be that Social Security policy affects aging, or GDP, or the form of the political institutions so that coefficients from a regression equation like those displayed in the third column of Table 1 should not be interpreted as the effects of democracy, GDP, and aging on public pension spending. But the time series relationships seen for a case study like Spain's might be more readily interpreted that way because we think that Franco's death would be the end of dictatorship regardless of when it occurred, and that the year of his death was not affected by Spain's pension spending, GDP, or the average age of its population. Unfortunately, case studies are not a full solution to this problem because, for example, the amount of public pension spending during a dictator's regime may affect the likelihood of democracy's emerging after his death and hence our choice of his country as a case study.
Our overall strategy for selecting countries for closer study is to first look for examples of a dramatic change in political regime (either from democracy to dictatorship or vice versa) and then observe whether this change is followed by dramatic alterations in the size or the design of the Social Security program relative to changes occurring elsewhere in the world. More specifically, we begin with two time averages for each country of the POLITY democracy index -1960-74 and 1975-90 -and take those countries for which the two averages indicate significant secular changes. Portugal and Spain stand out the most in this regard, with democracy index 0 prior to 1975 and 1 in most of the years after. Greece also stands out with democracy index 0.7 1960-66, 0 1967-73, and about 0.9 after 1975 . Chile is among the few countries with large democracy index reductions over the time period. This strategy can be helpful for testing the hypothesis that democracy does increase spending, but that we fail to detect it because of mismeasurement, because we select countries based on large and arguably genuine changes in democracy.
We then tried to find economically and demographically similar countries for comparison. This leads us immediately to Italy for comparison to Greece, Portugal and Spain. No country is such an obvious comparison for Chile, because no South American country in our data was particularly democratic during the period 1960-90, but maybe no particular comparison country is needed because some of the Chilean policies were obviously extreme, as we explain below.
IV.A. Southern Europe
Consider three European countries which have changed to and from democratic regimes during the past couple of decades -Greece, Portugal, and Spain -and compare them with another southern European country which has been continuously democratic since WWII. The top part of Table 5 shows how the countries share not only geography, but they also have similar postwar age demographics (percentage of population over age 65 increased 6-7 percentage points 1950-90), similar economic growth (GDP per capita grew 1.6-1.8 percentage points per year 1950-90), and similar income inequality (Gini coefficients of about 40 in 1974).
Are the different political histories associated with different SS histories? From the mid 1960's through the 1980's (the period during which we have pretty reliable and comparable spending data), Greece, Portugal, and Spain increased public pensions' percentage of GDP by 6.5, 4.9, and 6.2 percentage points, respectively, while Italy's increased 6.2 percentage points. Nearly all of the Greek pension share growth was during its democratic period (since 1975, and before 1967) , but Spain had similar spending share growth rates during its non-democratic and democratic -1966,1975-1975-1978-all Economics and Age- Demographics (1950-90) GDP per cap growth (%/year) 44 We believe that some of the Italian data reported by the ILO may not be comparable over time. However, the Bank of Italy reports that "regular" public pension spending's share of GDP grew by 5.6 percentage points 1966-90 and, as shown in Figure 1 , this growth was pretty steady over time. This is in line with the conclusions our Table 5 draws from the ILO data. 45 Italy's spending is further ahead of Portugal and Spain than we might guess from their age and GDP differences and the pension spending regression coefficient found with our 90 country sample. 46 Spain's dictator died in 1975, the first elections were held in June 1977, but the party that won the election was led by Adolfo Suarez, considered by many as Franco's heir (POLITY does not rate Spain as either democratic or nondemocratic in those years, but rather refers to the years as a "transition period"). The democratic constitution was passed in 1978. The military attempted a coup on February 23 rd 1981. Some analysts consider that Spain was not fully democratic until the Socialist Party (PSOE) won the 1982 elections (e.g., POLITY gives a rating of 0.9 for the years 1978-81, and 1.0 thereafter). Interestingly, Figure 1 suggests that SS spending slowed down (and even decreased) during the first few years of socialist government. After 1985, the Social Security growth process of the pre-democracy years seems to resume. Spain. 44 Italy had the most spending in 1966, although it was not far ahead of Greece. 45 Italy's spending share grew pretty steadily over time, while the Greek share hardly grew 1966-79, and then grew quite rapidly. By the late 1980's, the two countries were quite similar. Spain and Portugal both began the period with similar low levels of spending and grew at similar rates. 46 In terms of the age of the population, all four countries age at very similar rates. Greece, Portugal and Spain have very similar fractions of their population over age 65, and are each about one percentage point behind Italy on that metric throughout the period 1960-90.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin's SS design indicators show how all four of these countries now (as of 1995) have retirement tested SS benefits, with no delayed retirement credits. Greek and Italian benefits have relatively important means tests, while Spanish and Portuguese do not. Greece, Portugal, and Spain retirement-tested benefits both in their democratic and nondemocratic periods, while Italy moved from earnings tests to its current retirement test. The means testing of benefits has been fairly constant over time in these countries, except Italy where means-testing has become more important over time. All four countries have relied, and do rely, heavily on payroll taxes for SS program revenue. Greece and Spain capped their payroll tax (i.e., did not levy payroll tax on earnings a person has above some cap amount), and did so throughout the period. Interestingly, all four countries have shared, and do share, a financing difference with most other countries in the world -they all have much higher payroll taxes (nominally) levied on employers than those on employees.
periods (before and after 1975) , respectively, as did Portugal. Figure 1 supports this conclusion, using perhaps more reliable country-specific spending data for Italy and democratic period, as measured by our design and spending indicators, was similar to those of democratic Italy. Non-democratic Greece had a social security program of similar design to the others, but its share of GDP grew less rapidly. Spanish and Portuguese Social Security spending continued to grow at Italian rates during their democratic period. Democratic Greek spending grew more rapidly, in effect making up for its slower pre-1975 spending growth relative to the other three countries. In other words, of the political regimes represented in the Figure, the unusual one is nondemocratic Greece 1967-74 because it did not increase Social Security's share of GDP. Hence, the Greek case supports, while the Spanish and Portuguese cases contradict, the hypothesis that the introduction of the institution of voting should lead to higher SS spending growth. All three cases are inconsistent with the hypothesis that introducing democracy would significantly affect the design of tax and benefit formulas.
IV.B. Large Budgets in Chile Prior to 1981
A number of interesting transitions to and from democracy occurred in South America during the 1960-90 period. Our earlier work (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-iMartin, 2002) reports in some detail the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, with no evidence of a large or systematic effect of democracy on the size and design of Social Security. In spite of the poor quality of its pension spending data, Chile shows us how non-democracies have been known to create, or at least maintain, extremely large Social Security budgets. According to the IMF (ILO), Social Security and Welfare spending under General Pinochet exceeded 10 percent (6 percent) of GDP by 1981. As fractions of GDP, 6-10% is as large or larger than the Social Security budgets of European countries, despite the fact that only 6% of Chile's population was over age 65 (compare to 10-15% aged 65+ in most European countries). It is hard to tell from these data alone whether social spending grew to these levels under Pinochet, or under prior governments. But we do have some evidence that Pinochet's government, even though not immediately held accountable by an electoral process, was unprepared to reduce pension and other social spending during the first several years of its regime even when it meant increasing already high payroll tax rates. For example, SSA reports that almost 40 percentage points were added to the employer portion of payroll tax rates between 1973 and 1975, and In summary, Social Security policy in Spain and Portugal during their non- 47 Perhaps one explanation for the tax rate increases 1973-75 is the government's desire to maintain social spending while the tax base was shrinking (for example, real GDP per capita fell by 22% during the period).
The reader should note that changes in the employer tax rate does not accurately measure changes in the tax wedge created by the payroll tax, especially in a place like Chile where employer rates were so high. For this purpose, it is better to look at (employer rate + employee rate)/(1+employer rate) which, according to SSA, increases from about 35% in 1973 to 50% in 1975 (exact percentages depend on whether the contributor is a wage earner or a salaried worker). We thank Salvador Valdés for bringing this point to our attention, and refer readers to Barro and Sahasakul (1986) for further explanation of the formula. 48 Another interesting observation about Pinochet's public pension programs is that, according to the SSA, he did not change the design of public pensions prior to . In 1958 Chile had the same public pension policy regarding earnings and retirement tests (according to SSA, there were none except for salaried employees), and the payroll tax was not capped. that this increase lasted at least until 1977. 47 Hence, the first part of Pinochet's regime shows clearly that an electoral process is unnecessary for the maintenance of large social security budgets. 48 Foxley et al (1979, p. 129) report that 1969 Chilean social spending was 10-11 percent of GNP (6 of the 10-11 were spent on public pensions). ILO (1961, p. 205) reports that payroll tax revenue and social spending were already pretty high as long ago as 1951 -10.2 and 8.2 percent of national income, respectively. It is hard to tell how these data might be compared with IMF or later ILO data, but they show a lot of social spending prior to Pinochet, especially when we recognize that only 4.3 and 5.1 percent of the Chilean population were over age 65 in 1950 and 1970, respectively. The SSA reports pretty high payroll tax rates in, for example, 1958, 1969, 1971, and 1973 : about 20% for pensions and another 20% or more for other social programs. These pension payroll tax rates were similar to those in Argentina and Brazil at the time (Uruguay had higher rates, and Peru lower, by about 10 percentage points), and the Chilean rates for other programs were significantly higher. Arellano's (1985) series on payroll tax rates (employer and employee, all programs combined) for wage earners is 8% in 1952 and already 45% by 1960.
If Chilean pension spending growth occurred before Pinochet, was it under a democratic or nondemocratic regime? This is a hard question to answer, for two reasons. First, our data do not clearly indicate when the growth occurred. Arellano shows payroll tax rates quadrupling between 1952 and 1955 (from 8% to 33% -note that there was a major Social Security reform in 1952) and then growing to 50% by 1972, although ILO (1961, p. 205) does not report a dramatic payroll tax revenue increase any time between 1951 and 1957. Second, while the Chilean governments prior to Pinochet were relatively more democratic, which of them (if any) should be considered democratic? Consider the period 1952-54, when a major Social Security 49 http://www.countryreports.org/ 50 The 1924 "Ruido de Sables" is an interesting episode suggesting that nondemocracy was a factor. During that episode, there was a conflict between the Parliament and the military -the former wanted to increase congressional salaries and the latter thought social programs needed more attention! (http://icarito.tercera.cl/enc_virtual/historia/parlamento/parla7.html) 51 Chile's POLITY democracy score is less than 0.5 in all of the years 1818-1954, except 1888-90 (0.6) and 1891-23 (0.5) but even in these years POLITY notes that there were not fair and competitive elections. Also note that Bollen's (1980) democracy index is higher for Chile than for the U. S. in 1960 and 1965. reform was passed and payroll tax rates quadrupled (according to Arellano) . During this time, Chile's president was Ibañez, who was by all accounts a dictator in the 1920's. The POLITY project's democracy score is a mere 0.3 for Chile during these years, in part because Chile's chief executives were not always elected fairly and competitively (i.e., elections were "stacked"), executives had a lot of power, and some political parties were outlawed. During these years, POLITY ranks Chile as less democratic, and having less competitive elections, than Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, and other South American countries.
An early ILO report (1961) suggests that social spending (i.e., the sum of pension, health, family, and other social program spending) was already generous in Chile by 1951. A Chilean Social Security system was created in 1925, although this did not resemble the system as of 1952 because the 1925 system was designed to be fully funded (Foxley et al, p. 124 ). We are not sure of exactly which year the Chilean system was transformed to pay-as-you-go, but we point out that POLITY gives Chile a democracy score of 0.1 for the years 1925-34, in part because dictator Ibañez's regime In summary, all of our Chilean data are consistent with two conclusions that might be drawn by focusing on the key years 1925, 1952, and 1973 , and the few years immediately following each of them. First of all, the Chilean governments in these years were not democratic by any standard. Sometimes there were not elections, at other times there were elections but they were stacked and led to the appointment of an executive who was very powerful and often suppressed his political competition. Second, of all of the increase over time in pension spending and rates of payroll taxation, much of it occurred in these key years and the few years immediately following. Hence, the Chilean experience suggests that free and fair elections, or even elections of any kind, are not necessary to create, expand, and maintain a large Social Security system.
V. Conclusions
We have three main empirical findings regarding the relation between Social Security and democracy. First, holding constant the fraction of the population over age 65 and GDP per capita, we find no systematic evidence that democratic governments spend a larger share of GDP on Social Security, or that they differently adjust their spending to economic and demographic trends. Cross-country econometric estimates suggest that, if anything, democracies show lower levels of Social Security spending's share of GDP by 0.8 percentage points. Case studies of four countries show how countries with very different political histories, but similar economic and demographic histories, can have similar Social Security programs. A fifth country, Chile, shows that Social Security budgets can be quite large without democracy. Greece is the only case, out of five total, where we see some evidence consistent with a positive effect of democracy on Social Security spending, because Greek Social Security grew significantly in the early 1980's -only a few years after the Greek nondemocratic regime ended.
Second, democracies do not seem especially inclined to use Social Security as a means of helping the poor. Both case studies and cross-country regressions show little or no effect of democracy on Social Security program design. If anything, democracies are marginally more likely to cap their payroll tax and to tax employees rather than employers. We find no evidence that democracies are more likely to asset test, earnings test, or retirement test Social Security benefits.
Third, the relation between pension spending and economic and demographic variables seems to be the same in democracies and non-democracies. In particular, richer and older countries spend more of their GDP on public pensions, while inequality is uncorrelated with public pension spending.
Since the institution of voting, and political institutions more generally, are so different in democratic countries, our findings suggest that political institutions are quite minor determinants of the size and design of Social Security programs, or 52 Perhaps one answer is that, among democracies, voting institutions respond to some of the same forces that determine public spending (eg., deadweight costs -see Aghion et al 2002) , so that political institutions are significantly correlated with public spending among democracies (as Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) and Milesi-Ferreti et al (2002) observe) even while they have little direct impact on spending (as our data suggest).
at least that similar policies are likely to be adopted in economically and demographically similar countries with different political institutions. Much more important are economic and demographic variables, such as the aging of the population and economic growth. Social Security may still be a highly political issue, because economic and demographic variables may determine the political influence of various groups. For example, an aging population may have more political support for Social Security spending, but we believe that this influence would derive from the size and economic activity of the elderly population itself. It does not matter for the size and design of Social Security what are the details of the political institutions in which the various groups interact or even if voting by the citizenry is part of the political process.
A number of positive theories of the public sector in general, and Social Security in particular, are built on models of voting in which the public policy chosen by the voting mechanism is highly sensitive to the rules of the mechanism. Are the implications of those models consistent with our findings? If voting institutions are a serious part of those analyses -as they clearly are in studies like Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) or Cooley and Soares (1999) -then at least we can conclude that voting models do not explain why Social Security has grown, why it is pay-as-you-go, earnings-tested but not asset-tested, and financed with capped payroll taxes, because non-democracies have such similar Social Security programs. Perhaps the models of voting institutions are designed to explain why, for example, a parliament might create a bigger Social Security program than would a Congressional system. But could it be that policy is largely independent of whether there is voting or not, but when there is democracy policy is highly dependent on the form of the voting institution?
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There are relatively few positive political theories of Social Security in nondemocracies so, even if existing voting models do an adequate job of explaining policy differences among democracies, little is understood about the political economics of Social Security for the other half of the world. What is the right direction for nondemocratic political economic theory? Perhaps our results provide some guidance -that a useful non-democratic theory would not focus too much on the workings of a nondemocratic regime without counterparts in democracies. Maybe pressure groups, or efficiency factors, would be some of the foremost considerations. An important challenge for political economics is to use the policy behavior seen in nondemocratic countries to flush out the implications of democratic models, and to develop new models that explain why the elderly enjoy political success in non-democracies as well as democracies.
VI. Data Appendix
The table below shows, for our main 90-country sample, which country-years are missing from the ILO pension spending data. Using the Social Security Administration's (1995) report of each country's Social Security program's first year, we have found that much of the missing ILO data derives from the fact that some countries did not have Social Security during each of the years 1960-90. We therefore fill in the ILO data with zeros for each year since 1960 and before the first year of Social Security (typically for African and Middle Eastern countries prior to 1975). Dark boxes are country-years with no Social Security program, and white boxes are country-years with Social Security but no ILO data.
All of the countries in the Table have at least 5 years of positive ILO data. But if we combine the ILO data with the zeros, there are ten more countries with 5 years of data (including the zero spending years as data points) and with GDP and demographic data. These countries are (with year of first SS law in paren): Chad (1984) , Gambia (1981) , Ghana (1965) , Haiti (1965 ), South Korea (1973 ), Liberia (1972 ), Oman (1975 ), Papua New Guinea (1980 , Thailand (1990) , and Zimbabwe (1993). If we average the zero spending years with the positive spending years reported by ILO (if any), we get essentially zero spending for all of them: Haiti has the highest estimate, spending 0.02% of GDP. Zero is probably a pretty accurate estimate for most of these countries, except for South Korea, Thailand, and Oman which, if ILO had reported any spending for them, might be significant given their age and level of development. In any case, our regression estimates are similar if we exclude all 10 countries, include all 10, or just include those 7 where we suspect zero to be an accurate spending estimate: democracy coefficient point estimates are -0.82 (see column 3 of Table 1 ), -0.64, and -0.62, respectively.
We also point out that, in the 90 country cross-section sample, the POLITY democracy index is correlated 0.69, 0.67, and 0.59 with log real GDP per capita, elderly per capita, and the fraction of population urban, respectively.
